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Introduction
This contribution examines the relationship between violent conflict and the crisis of representation in an African country by focusing on political parties and rebel movements. It deals with the "chicken or the egg" question of whether inadequate representation leads to violent conflict or whether violent conflict damages representative democracy. Political parties are assumed to represent social interests; in the context of the plural society of the Central African Republic (CAR) these are mainly ethnoregional interests. As will be shown, political parties have not performed well in their representative role, for a number of reasons (from objec-6 Mehler: Reshaping Political Space? tive obstacles such as organizational shortcomings and lack of means of communication to rent-seeking behavior). Numerous rebel movements claim to put local and national grievances on the agenda; they are heard and therefore seem to address these issues better than parties. Parties and rebel movements therefore compete to a certain extent, but political parties lose out in the course of war and in peace processes, not least because they are no longer regarded as the main actors by international mediators.
The relationship between political parties and violence can be complex, particularly when violence has become an established mode of competition, as is the case in many African states. More importantly, civilian political parties can fall prey to armed insurgencies in an indirect but significant way: They are simply no longer the most important actors in the political game when peace negotiations involve the government on the one hand and rebel movements on the other. Political parties also have to position themselves between alignment and critique with respect to violent actors-a potentially risky business. They may ultimately lose out as a result of power-sharing arrangements enacted in peace agreements. In such processes they usually receive substantially less attention from the media and the donor community present in the country than most armed movements do (Mehler 2009 ). Moreover, the difficulties of political parties in representing supposedly ethnoregional interests are aggravated by rebel movements which appeal to the same clientele. Formerly violent actors, the warlords and rebel movements, may turn their organizations into political parties and compete in future elections-it cannot be ignored that they are often more successful than their peaceful competitors at the polls. In the end, political parties become marginalized. Violence pays; democracy is harmed. By focusing differently on civilian political parties-that is, on their role in conflict and their (in)capacity to represent ethnoregional interests, contrary to general assumptions-and on rebel movements-that is, on their ability to sideline civilian competitors instead of the difficulty of transforming them into political parties ("from bullets to ballots")-this paper seeks to address questions that escape the attention of wellintentioned policy makers and mainstream research alike.
Methodologically, the paper addresses its hypotheses in the following way: The main (north/south) ethnoregional cleavages, together with further types, are described and analyzed in relation to the changing election results from 1993 to 2005. The limited responsiveness of the political system to ethnoregional grievances is shown through the demonstration of the limited amount of public goods provided in the periphery. The supposed social and political basis of rebel movements is contrasted with their clearly opportunistic rent-seeking behavior. Behavioral patterns of opposition parties towards the use of violence are also analyzed. By analyzing the composition and dramaturgy of peace processes (international negotiations including power-sharing devices plus internal dialogue processes), the paper demonstrates the declining importance of political parties in the political game. Finally, selected biographical data shows that some of the key stakeholders in CAR politics are straddling roles as violent entrepreneurs and as civilian politicians and thereby setting problematic 7 standards for political careers. As a result both peace and democracy have suffered enormously over the last two decades.
There is a growing body of literature on the transition from rebel movements to political parties (e.g., De Zeeuw 2008 , Dudouet 2009 , Deonandan/Close/Prevost 2007 , Kovacs Söderbergh 2008 , but relatively little is said about the fate or strategies of "ordinary," "civilian" parties in that context. Some works specifically focus on the challenges of post-conflict elections (Lyons 2005) or of power sharing (Sriram 2008 , Jarstad 2008 , Mehler 2009 ), but most focus on the general transition to peace. The focus of the Jarstad/Sisk (2008) volume is fortunately about "war to democracy transitions." Its contributions show that policy makers' expectations that those transitions result more or less automatically in both peace and democracy are highly problematic and naive. Manning (2004 Manning ( , 2007 is interested in the description of challenges that parties themselves face in moving from battlefield to political arena. She finds (2007: 268) that intense competition forces parties to adapt but does not necessarily make them more moderate, more institutionalized internally, or more committed to democratic competition. In the following pages the interest is not so much the organizational problems of parties-particularly violent ones-during transition, but rather their representational function and their changing attitudes towards violent conflict.
Political parties ideally represent social interests. The latter may be in conflict, and sometimes this conflict degenerates into violent conflict. Sartori posits that parties are or should be "an instrument […] for representing the people by expressing their demands" (Sartori 1976: 27) . Different forms or degrees of representation may be distinguished, and the symbolic/descriptive and responsive/substantive ends of a continuum may be juxtaposed. In the African context, it is assumed that the predominant division of social interests is frequently ethnoregional in nature, although doubts are permitted, particularly with regard to the assumed link between ethnicity and party politics (Basedau/Stroh 2009) . 1 Ethnoregional groups certainly do not exist "objectively" and with a clear consciousness on their own. "Rather both groups and their interests are to an extent constituted through the political process itself" (Randall 2007: 84) . Randall-in an initial sketch of the representational function of political parties in Africa (2007: 101)-comes to the conclusion that African political parties in general may offer some degree of descriptive representation […] for ethnic groups […] but that evidence of more substantive, responsive representation of these social groups […] is much harder to find. Whilst (some) ethnic groups may appear to enjoy a form of substantive or interest representation, through 1 Randall (2007: 90) opts for ethnoregional instead of just ethnic interests: "In fact numerous studies of recent elections in tropical Africa, given the frequent tendency for concentrations of particular ethnic groups to coincide with administrative region boundaries, refer to "ethno-regional" identities (for instance Nugent on Ghana, 2001) . However, supposing that ethnicity and regionalism are distinct bases of political identity and behavior, then in studies of some national elections the suggestion is made that what looks like or is described as ethnically-based voting is really regionalism." the processes of clientelism, in reality it may be closer to symbolic collective representation.
The question, then, is whether armed insurgencies are more able to represent ethnoregional interests than political parties.
This contribution addresses these more general points by focusing on the exemplary case of the CAR since the mid-1990s. The country experienced a fairly successful democratic transition in the early 1990s but is one of the African cases where a mixture of basic state fragility and mismanagement led to widespread violence only few years later (similar to Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville, where the democratic experience was even more short-lived). The case is also an example of a "democracy to warlord politics transition," as will be shown. This contribution (a) looks systematically for indicators of the decline in the political importance of parties in times of mutiny, civil war, and rebellion and (b) puts them in the context of two main characteristics of contemporary history: a problematic elite attitude towards (political) violence and the dynamics of peace processes, including their unintended consequences.
Therefore, the general relationship between political parties and violent conflicts is characterized before a closer look is taken at the peace process (or the various peace processes) and the changing role of political parties in it. In conclusion, the paper assesses whether there is competition over the representation of ethnoregional interests between political parties and armed insurgencies.
Parties and Cleavages, Conflict and Violence in the CAR
Conflicts are often first and foremost nonviolent conflicts. Societal cleavages are seen as essential for the shaping of a party system, and this is also assumed to hold true for African countries. However, the classical European cleavages along the axes of church versus state, labor versus capital, urban versus rural areas, center versus periphery are only partially relevant (Erdmann 2007) .
Ethnoregional Cleavages in the CAR's Political System
For a long time, up to the end of the 1980s, the most relevant cleavage in the CAR was more or less an ethnoregional one with a clear north-south divide (or savaniers versus riverains, see Table 2 ). The main political personalities of the country-Barthélémy Boganda, Jean-Bédel Bokassa and David Dacko-were south-western (of the comparatively small Ngbaka ethnic group); Abel Goumba (Banziri) and André Kolingba (Yakoma) were south-central elites. The densely populated north-west (Gbaya, Sara, and also Mandja) felt neglected, and Ange-Félix Patassé, an ambitious up and coming politician and prime minister under Bokassa from 1976 to 1978 built on this grievance, though he made his career in Bangui. The capital, the bulk of formal educational institutions, health centers, etc. were all located in the south. Mehler: Reshaping Political Space? 9 Change did occur in the 1990s, but initially not in terms of the general north-south divide. In fact, election results from the 1990s (1993 and 1998/99) show a remarkable similarity concerning the outcome for the ruling party, Mouvement pour la Libération du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC; founded in 1982 and for a long time dominated by Patassé). It received 40-50 percent of the votes each time, something which could be explained by the existence of a rather stable ethnoregional alliance (mainly Sara and Gbaya) in the north-west and the north (Table 1) . ( In fact, both Patassé and Goumba, Patassé's challenger in the second round of the 1993 presidential elections, had clear regional strongholds, with Patassé winning more than 85 percent in three out of 17 prefectures (north-west: Ouham, Ouham-Pendé and Nana-Gribizi) and
Goumba equally 85 percent in four, less densely populated prefectures (south-east: Ouaka, ment Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC) was too weak to win multiparty elections but strong enough to persist as the major opposition party. It won its seats mostly in the southern and south-eastern parts of the country. Kolingba's own ethnic group, the Yakoma, was the main ethnic group supporting the party, but the Yakoma vote alone would not have been enough to win the amount of seats the RDC actually won. In fact, there were other notable dynamics in the political geography during the 1990s, for example, the declining popularity of the "fourth" candidate Goumba and his Front Patriotique pour le Progrès (FPP), a party with deep political roots but without a continued organizational existence. 3 The RDC clearly profited from the declining popularity of the Goumba camp after the 1993 elections. Other shifting alliances in the southern block were also observed (Mehler 2005) . Thus, only the MLPC and the RDC can be termed stable political parties.
It appears as if it was initially not necessary to compete for the votes of ethnic parties' "core"
voters. Nevertheless, at the margins of each party's electorate there was intense nonviolent competition. The parties or their leaders probably held some clientelist appeal among their followers, although Goumba in particular never wanted to appear as the typical African "big man." In Randall's terms (2007: 90) even the bigger parties MLPC and RDC could still be seen as representing ethnoregional interests "to the extent that parties are identified by their leaders and/or in the public mind with one or more ethnic groups," while it was also appropriate to ask "in what sense are they representing those groups"? (emphasis in the original).
The FPP and, arguably, three other parties (ADP, PSD, MDD), with their long-lasting existence and ability to win mandates, may be seen as additional parties of significant importance that merit attention for the sake of the argument of this contribution.
The "Northern Alliance" was probably terminally ended by Bozizé's (of Gbaya origin) revolt against his former mentor Patassé (from the Suma minority, but usually identified with Sara) 4 and the subsequent armed takeover of state power in 2002/03. Both Gbaya and Sara are major ethnic groups in the north/north-west of the country, and they believed that they had ex- 
Growing Fragmentation
The MLPC thus did not "deliver" to its main constituencies, but it was not the only party to experience setbacks. The degree of fragmentation of the party system has been increasing since 1993 (see Table 1 ). This has served as an initial indicator of a loss of influence on the part of the main political parties. Whereas the RDC and the MLPC together controlled 47 out of 85 seats after the 1993 elections (55.3 percent) and the six most important parties con- noregional representation? Or was it just a matter of unfair elections? Probably not the latter:
The elections were not openly manipulated, at least not on a countrywide level. Even more significant than the loss of seats for major parties was the increase in the number of independent candidates elected: 34 members of parliament were elected as independents. These figures could be taken as clear evidence of the declining importance of political parties in an era of growing violence. However, political parties have themselves been part of this evolution (see Table 2 ). 7 
Party-related Violence
The CAR's transitional context is obviously important for understanding party-related violence. The CAR is an example of a transition that was perverted by the undemocratic behavior of democratically elected rulers (similar to Congo-Brazzaville). President Patassé's governance style included widespread mismanagement, self-enrichment, the buying of MPs and the exclusion of formerly privileged groups. These activities formed the background for mutinies (1996/97), coup attempts (2001/02) and the successful rebellion (2003) . Patassé had created his own personal armed groups (Karako militia and others), but they were not formally related to the MLPC. This party, founded in the 1980s, was in fact solidly anchored in society and different currents existed within it, some of which were critical of Patassé. It would be wrong to assume that the MLPC was an instrument in the grip of its chairman Patassé (Brad- 3 Peace Negotiations and Imperfect Dialogue Processes
The First Peace Process
International actors also exerted an influence in the interplay between civilian and armed ac- the opposition alliance G-11 took part, and although it suspended its participation for some days for procedural reasons, a national reconciliation pact was still signed at the end of the meeting. This was the last time that political parties played such an important role in the peace process.
It is essential to recognize that the armed conflicts in 1996/97-and equally importantly, the character of their resolution-had certain highly negative effects on the political climate in the country: effects that undermined the prospects for both democracy and the preservation 8 The minister of the interior suspended inter alia the activities of the party for several months.
of civil peace. Furthermore, the activities of international actors-despite good intentionseffectively contributed to the poisoning of the political environment.
In the first place, the character of the conflict-settlement process, as promoted by international actors, amplified the tension between the principle of accommodation and the practice of exclusionary and privatized politics. International actors continuously asked for broader representation of the radical and partly violent opposition, and later rebels, in government.
And at some point, something close to this objective was achieved: the mutinies of 1996/97 led to the inclusion of some rebel leaders in roles entailing governmental responsibility, as we have seen. Patassé also felt compelled to include a rather substantial number of opposition members in his government, but he was able to handpick which members would be included and which portfolios they obtained. In parallel he appointed more and more advisors, who formed a kind of a shadow cabinet where the real decisions were taken.
Thus, what appears to have occurred with this first conflict-settlement episode was a temporary and cosmetic acceptance of inclusive politics, largely as a result of international pressure. The practice of inclusion did not, however, lead to any real participation in the decision-making process by former counter-elites. Even less so was it perceived to have led to an equal representation of ethnoregional interests. In practice, the agreement involved more of an extension of rents to those elites with the power to disrupt civil peace. That the National
Assembly later decided to attribute substantial pensions to former presidents Dacko and Kolingba (October 30, 1997) testifies to this. Such pensions were clearly a bonus for the renunciation of violence.
A dangerous precedent was established in the resolution of these conflicts. A lesson apparently learnt by local actors was that the threat of violence could be instrumentalized to receive material rewards. For instance, the mutineers were immediately accepted as a negotiation partner and concessions were made quickly-much more quickly than to the civilian opposition. Exerting violence proved to be a means to garner international attention, which, at least at first glance, proved rewarding. One message emanating from this situation was that those losing out in the redistribution of sinecures should retain their capacity to sustain conflict (inter alia arms). This would preserve their capacity to come back to the "dining room." 9
Additionally, it is important to state that electoral violence in the CAR was constantly com- The CAR example is in line with Bratton and van de Walle's (1997: 269) argument that a transition from neopatrimonial rule is prone to a violent end because of the tendency of the new democratically elected president to distribute according to a neopatrimonial logic, but this time not to the same circle of persons.
the bloody coup attempt in May 2001, but again it is doubtful whether his RDC was involved: the party never formally endorsed its leader's decision.
From Patassé to Bozizé
In In this context, Patassé offered a "national dialogue without exclusion" on New Year's Eve, but he only gradually received support for the idea. Political parties in fact had a difficult choice to make in these days: siding with the republic and accepting dialogue meant siding with a president who did not show respect for democracy (or the constitution); siding with Bozizé-which many parties ultimately did-meant siding with a violent actor of doubtful democratic credentials. Getting rid of Patassé at any price was apparently the order of the day.
Patassé seemed completely isolated, the country devastated, and democracy in shambles 16-17. 13 The Economist Intelligence Unit (CAR report, March 2009) notes that Demafouthʹs appointment was denounced by the rival MLJC, which has been excluded from the government and various implementation committees.
Rebellion and a New Peace Process
The exclusion of Patassé from the elections in 2005 triggered a rebellion in his home region.
Additionally, so-called "liberators," partly Chadian mercenaries and partly CAR nationals who had helped Bozizé take power (Debos 2007 He was said to have links to practically all operating rebel movements, particularly the FDPC but also the UFDR. The content of the January peace agreement was limited, but it included an immediate ceasefire. A vague reference was made to "the participation of FDPC and UFDR in the management of state affairs, in a spirit of reconciliation and in conformity with the Constitution." 14 The UFDR commanders and others distanced themselves from the treaty, and new attacks on Birao were launched. The French army had to intervene again. A separate peace agreement with the UFDR was signed on April 13 (see Table 3 ). 15
On April 24, 2007, the APRD, which was close to Patassé, attacked an army convoy. Shortly before the attack, the army had conducted one of its infamous raids in the north-west of the country. The APRD, which was initially excluded from the peace process, had continued to 14 The text of the Syrte Agreement is available at http://alliance-democratie-progres. fight (maybe for this reason) and to appeal for an inclusive dialogue. 16 It is essential to acknowledge that political parties gradually lost their significance in the peace process with every major episode of violence (see Table 2 ). 18 The law specified that it excluded genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as well as all acts under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Jean-Pierre Bemba, once DR Congo's vice president and before that rebel leader, had been arrested in May 2008 near Brussels precisely for his role in crimes against humanity perpetrated by his troops in the CAR when they fought alongside Patassé's army in 2002-2003, see also Glasius 2008. 19 Text reprinted in Afrique Express 133, 20 January 1997, p.8. 20 lʹUnion des forces républicaines, a smaller rebel movement headed by Lt. Florian Njadder.
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Dialogue Again, but Differently
One of the original UFDR factions, Abakar Sabone's Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ), which had left the UFDR, joined the Libreville peace agreement only on December 7, 2008. By its military strength, this was certainly not the most important rebel movement; content-wise, however, it was probably the most outspoken one.
The beginning of the so-called "inclusive political dialogue" followed this last signature. The preparatory committee had presented its final report to Bozizé in April after two months of negotiations between government representatives and the three main rebel movements. The at the beginning, participated at least for the last day. In the end, the participants and most importantly Bozizé agreed to form an inclusive consensus government, hold free and transparent elections, install a follow-up committee, and create a truth and reconciliation commission. The follow-up committee was composed of former presidents Patassé and Kolingba, plus Bozizé. There were no seats for the civilian or the armed opposition. 23 Not only in formal peace agreements but also in dialogue processes, the civilian opposition had lost out (Table 4 ).
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Most of the time including the MLPC and the RDC as heavyweights and the ADP as a secondary force. Chairmanship was given to Henri Pouzère, leader of the Association Löndö and member of parliament, who had formerly been a very outspoken civil society representative. According to Bradshaw (2008) , the UVFN had 19 seats in parliament.
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Pouzère wanted to transform the inclusive political dialogue into a sort of "national sovereign conference."
He also asked Bozizé to explain the reasons for his rebellions in 2002 and 2003. In this way, he questioned the existence and the legitimacy of any armed pursuit of political interests. See Agence Centrafricaine de Presse, 10 December 2008. His statements were apparently shocking to most participants at the meeting. 23 Xinhua, 21 December 2008. The consensus government was eventually formed on January 19, 2009, but offered only limited opportunities for participation to civilian opposition and rebel movements. Three opposition members, Moïse Kotaye, André Nalke Dorogo (MLPC), and Raymond Adouma were appointed to the junior ministries of small and medium-sized enterprises, public health and international cooperation, respectively. Françoise Naoyama of the APRD became the environment minister, and Djomo Didou of the UFDR the housing minister. New rebel alliances were subsequently formed, and new skirmishes took place in the first half of 2009. At the time of writing, it appears premature to believe in the success of the peace process.
Representation of Social Interests via Rebel Movements?
Rebel movements have far more obvious direct links to the use of violence than their civilian opponents; it is not necessary to prove this. But what can be said about the representational side of the armed movements? All in all, there have been few clear statements of what the various rebels stand for. The more political of the stated aims of rebel representatives has been "to sit down and to discuss" national problems. They have also accused the current government of corruption, mismanagement and the pursuit of narrow ethnic interests (of Bozizé's Gbaya group). The professed readiness to join a power-sharing government might be seen as nothing more than rent-seeking behavior and not an acknowledgement of the need for more consensual decision-making 24 A few NGO reports consider the UFDR rebellion to have been an expression of the grievances of the Gula (Human Rights Watch 2007: 78-79) . UFDR president Djotodia repeatedly criticized the "exclusionist" policies of the regime and was quoted as follows: "Many people from other ethnic groups and different political parties are ostracized and banned from participating in the management of the country." 25
The best-known UFDR commander, Zaccharia Damane, cited additional grievances: the impassability of the roads in the region (Vakaga), the lack of health care, the lack of education, and the insufficient access to portable water. for an overhaul of the political class-another bold statement. 28 An occasional commentator on the private Internet platform Sangonet clearly exposed the ideological and programmatic poverty of all rebel movements and declared that their activities were nothing but criminal. 32 It is difficult to come to a different conclusion. It may therefore be of greater interest to determine what the social background of rebel movements is.
However, we lack clear information on recruitment practices and the ethnoregional affiliation of individual fighters. Findings from Debos (2008) corroborate the impression that many formerly pro-Bozizé fighters, some of Chadian origin, have joined the anti-Bozizé rebel movements. It thus appears that it is not political conviction but rather material gain that is their main motivation. Armed rebellion in the CAR has, however, had an unintended political consequence. Rebel movements, their repression, and the collateral damage in terms of human rights violations have attracted the attention of the "international community"-humanitarian NGOs, the UN organizations, and the European Union. The number of recent reports on the most remote areas of the CAR-particularly on the north-east, but also on the north-is unprecedented.
Who would have talked (or even known) about the Gula before the UFDR conquest of Birao?
Randall speculates about the possibility that political parties themselves create the ethnoregional groups they pretend to represent (Randall 2007: 85) ; why can't this also be true of rebellions? Ethnic grievances are put on the national and international agendas through rebellion-despite serious doubts about the sincerity of their promoters. And it should also be immediately added that those grievances have significantly increased in the process of rebellion and repression.
It might also be significant that the three elected members of parliament from Vakaga Prefecture-with the provincial capital Birao, the scene of major destruction in 2006/07-changed 100 percent with each election (in 1993, 1998 and 2005) and that the weight of the major parties steadily declined over the same period (1993: 2 RDC, 1 MLPC; 1998: 1 MLPC, 1 PSD, 33 1 independent; 2005: 2 KNK, 1 independent). This may have to do generally with the viability of democracy in a country without the most basic roads infrastructure, something which makes accountability on the part of elected MPs objectively difficult as they most probably would not report back, not even on a yearly basis. For representational democracy to function this is certainly a key -impediment-objectively speaking.
It might, however, also be a sign of the failure of political parties to organize themselves efficiently in the periphery of such a country. Can rebel movements do better? The tendency of the CAR's rebel movements to transform themselves into political parties suggests rather the contrary. Besides the rational wish to "reinvent" themselves in peaceful times (for Côte d'Ivoire see Förster 2009), this rebel-movement-to-party transition may also be in accordance with the advice of outside mediators. 34 In comparison to Côte d'Ivoire, it is clear that not only political parties but also rebel movements in the CAR have less to offer to the population (see However, the negative outcomes of rebel activities for the population do not mean that these groups have not brought about change, particularly with regard to political space. Over decades political life was centered on Bangui and the south, and the negative consequences of the mutinies in the 1990s were concentrated there. It should be noted that the traditional political parties cared little about citizens in the remote periphery, even though the Zaraguina phenomenon (roving highway robbers, the abduction of children for ransom, and assaults on buses and small villages) is an old one and had a direct impact on the lives of Northerners for a long time. As a result of rebel activities, national and international awareness of the plight of people living in the periphery of the CAR has grown considerably over the last decade.
Conclusions
Political parties have lost out in the CAR's recurrent violent crisis and in the peace process.
Established parties' loss of representational weight in parliament and their sidelining in both peace negotiations and dialogue processes are major indicators of this. The amount of attention given to the main political parties, and their room to maneuver, has declined rapidly since 1997. The parties themselves may bear part of the responsibility as (a) their relation to violence and violent actors has not always been clear and (b) they have offered few services to the population. Compared to other countries where peace agreements have led to sophisticated post-conflict power-sharing agreements favoring rebel movements (for example, Burundi, DR Congo), however, it may be claimed that the comparative political loss in the CAR has been limited. At the same time it has to be noted that rewarding the use of violence by admitting the perpetrators to the negotiation table after a show of force is very dangerous (Tull and Mehler 2005) . This could prompt even more peaceful political parties to change their strategy, and there are convincing signs that this will indeed be the case in the CAR.
Upon closer inspection it becomes clear that the relationship between political parties and violent conflicts in the CAR is highly complex as some of the most active political entrepreneurs create or use political parties and military organizations (including rebel forces and the official army) more or less interchangeably for their political purposes. This process has clearly accelerated since 1996. The few classical parties (plus civil society) have suffered a political setback; they have not been able to make their voice heard. The donor communityinterested principally in a quick, superficial peace-has largely disregarded them. Civilian political parties were invited to the two dialogue forums organized in 2003 and 2008 and contributed content-wise; however, they were absent from the peace negotiations proper. Finally, there have been very few attempts by the rebel organizations themselves to occupy political space by proposing to represent ethnic or other collective interests. Only a few, hardly convincing, claims have been voiced in this regard. With the exception of allusions to a Muslim agenda by Abakar Sabone and the vague sympathies of the UFDR for the Gula, the groups offer little in ideological terms. Claims from the rebel groups which are heard much more frequently are that their organizers will block the official security forces' attacks on civilians. The security grievances of the population are cited as a justification for armed rebellion (while rebels themselves provide the context, or at least the pretext, for the very same brutality by armed forces).
Political parties and rebel movements in the CAR may "stand for" the interests or grievances of ethnoregional groups, yet it is hard to identify many activities undertaken by these organizations which one could easily classify as "acting for" those same groups. This latter, more substantive, form of representation has until now obviously been rare-maybe because of the specific contextual conditions of the CAR. The example of Côte d'Ivoire, where rebel leaders have tried hard to create their own local legitimacy (while not standing in national elections, at least so far) and where political parties have remained the prime political actors, suggests that there could be important variations at play in post-conflict societies. Can the representative know what the interests of the represented are without consultation? This is difficult to believe. The low level of reelections to parliament in the CAR, portrayed in the case of Vakaga Prefecture, suggests that voters do not consider their deputies to be responsive to their concerns. Only at the local level is it possible that traditional forms of consultation between the population and the (local) elite may play a role; the other form of consultation is intra-elite dialogue of dubious value. It is doubtful whether rebel movements do any better than parties at representing group interests. They may get more or less voluntary popular support at times, but they cannot be held accountable by the local population they claim to defend; elected members of parliament at least face the destiny of not being reelected. The CAR thus faces a continued crisis of representation, and both peace and democracy have suffered from the recent devaluation of political parties and the militarization of politics.
